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Abstract
This article uses the case of animal welfare to contribute to academic debates about audit and
better regulation reforms designed to reduce administrative burdens and increase regulatory
effectiveness. Combining desk-based policy document analysis, on-farm field visits, and 31
interviews with livestock farmers and animal health and welfare inspectors in England, it
explores farmers’ record-keeping practices and the contrasting role regulatory records are
understood to play in assurance and good animal husbandry by farmers, regulatory inspectors,
and veterinary experts. Farmers experience record-keeping as something they must do to satisfy
external regulatory demands rather than anything that good farmers might themselves use in
caring for their livestock. As a result they regard paperwork as burdensome and often fail to
comply with record-keeping requirements. By contrast, inspectors and animal welfare experts
frame record-keeping and analysis as central to good animal husbandry and to a properly
anticipatory approach to managing animal health and welfare. Those veterinary-medical
presumptions about farm practice inform both the design of specific animal welfare record-
keeping requirements and their self-effacing conceit as being about peering over the farmer’s
shoulder to audit already existing records. Our findings highlight the dual tendency for the
practice of regulatory record-keeping to become decoupled from both the formal
requirements and from the quality of care that paperwork is meant to assure. Our analysis
extends the critical literature on audit and regulation by drawing on the materialist tradition of
science and technology studies to elucidate how this decoupling is shaped by the physical form
and materiality of records themselves.
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Introduction
Alongside feeding, mucking out and other work caring for animals, livestock farming also
involves increasing volumes of regulatory reporting and paperwork. Reducing those
administrative burdens has been a central aim of ‘better regulation’ reforms
internationally (Braithwaite, 2008; Hood and Dixon, 2015; Radaelli, 2007). ‘Better
regulation’, Defra (2014) promises, ‘can encourage economic growth by freeing business
from unnecessary regulatory burdens and contribute to improving the environment and
protecting human health’.
To achieve those aims, successive UK Governments and the European Commission have
made a number of reforms to regulatory reporting and inspection requirements. First, rather
than inspecting all businesses, the Commission is now encouraging – and the UK
Government formally requires (BERR, 2007) – regulators to use ‘risk-based’ prioritization
to target enforcement activities on those businesses posing the greatest non-compliance risks
(Demeritt et al., 2015). Thus, farmers who join approved private assurance and certiﬁcation
schemes can ‘earn recognition’ and face less frequent government inspections. Second, new
better regulation guidelines now formalize the long-standing expectation that ‘regulators
should collectively follow the principle of ‘‘collect once, use many times,’’ when requesting
information from those they regulate’ (BIS, 2014, paragraph 4.1; cf. EC, 2015). Finally, in an
eﬀort to avoid command-and-control regulation altogether, governments increasingly look
to private regulation by business and civil society organizations (Vogel, 2008) and to
libertarian paternalist techniques of ‘nudge’ (Jones et al., 2014), such as information
disclosure and education, to achieve their policy goals through voluntary behaviour
change rather than state coercion.
In this article, we use the case of animal welfare regulation to explore the practical
challenges of squaring the better regulation circle of increasing regulatory eﬀectiveness
while also lowering compliance costs. Over the last two decades the volume of animal
welfare regulation has increased substantially (Ransom, 2007), in response both to
mounting public concern with food safety, quality and ethical consumerism and to
supply-side shifts in an increasingly global agri-food system (Busch and Bain, 2004;
Freidberg, 2004; Higgins and Lawrence, 2007; Smith et al., 2004). The Macdonald et al.
(2011, paragraph 5.01) review of farming regulation found that ‘if there is a single
‘‘universal’’ complaint from farmers . . . it is paperwork. Almost all consultees identiﬁed
‘‘forms’’ as the single most burdensome and arduous aspect of any regulation’.
However, research on regulation of food and agriculture has focused on the politics of
standard-setting (Bain et al., 2013; Davey and Richards, 2013; Loconto and Busch, 2010;
Miele and Lever, 2013) and on diagnosing the drivers and distributional implications of
the shift from state-centred regulation to more networked and private governance (Buller
and Roe, 2014; Fuchs and Kalfagianni, 2010; Guthman, 2007; Henson and Reardon, 2005;
Lockie, 2008; Marsden, 2013). Practical implementation and the eﬀectiveness of regulatory
inspection and reporting requirements have largely been ignored by political geographers
and agro-food scholars. Our article addresses that gap. It focuses on animal welfare
reporting and record-keeping and the roles that they play in regulatory assurance and
animal care.
In doing so, we also address an important puzzle facing animal welfare regulators in the
UK. Despite concerted eﬀorts by Defra to clarify the legal requirements, oﬃcial statistics
show that record-keeping violations are by far the most common breach of animal welfare
regulations in England. Rather than poor care, farmers are facing ﬁnes for poor paperwork.
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The reasons for this non-compliance and its implications for animal welfare outcomes are
poorly understood (Escobar and Buller, 2014), prompting the UK Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Aﬀairs (Defra) to commission the research reported here.
Combining desk-based review methods with original interviews and ﬁeld visits with livestock
farmers, this article analyses farmers’ record-keeping practices and the tensions between
their understandings of record-keeping and of good animal husbandry and those
articulated by Defra (2003b; FAWC, 2011), animal welfare experts (Main et al., 2014),
and by front-line inspectors responsible for enforcing animal welfare regulations.
Conceptually our analysis extends recent work in critical social science on audit and
paperwork. Research in policy studies and public administration has highlighted the dual
tendency for audit processes both to become decoupled from the qualities they are meant to
assure and to become an end in themselves, distorting performance and promoting tick-box
compliance. At the heart of audit is paperwork, which Science and Technology Studies (STS)
has approached as a technology materializing the political and embodying scripts designed
to shape the identity and behaviour of users. Those literatures are reviewed in the second
section of the article followed by a description of our data and methods. Three further
sections discuss how farmers and inspectors engage with the three types of animal welfare
records required by government guidance and regulation: mortality records, medicine
records and farm health plans (FHPs). The article closes by reﬂecting on the signiﬁcance
of our ﬁndings for academic debates about audit, animal welfare and better regulation.
Audit, assurance and animal welfare regulation
Traditionally animal welfare law in England has emphasized enforced self-regulation
(Braithwaite, 1982). Although there is a long history of British legislation to prevent
cruelty and protect animals, it is largely principles-based, imposing broad duties on
farmers rather than mandating detailed rules for animal welfare (Woods, 2011). To ﬂesh
out those broad duties and provide guidance as to what they entail, farmers were encouraged
to follow voluntary, but recommended, codes of practice (e.g. MAFF, 1969).
In recent years, however, the volume, stringency and reach of animal welfare regulations
have increased substantially. Private welfare standards have proliferated (Bain et al., 2013;
Henson and Reardon, 2005). Although ostensibly voluntary, their requirements are diﬃcult
for farmers to ignore insofar as certiﬁcation is required by the major retailers (Davey and
Richards, 2013). Statutory welfare regulation has grown as well, driven by a steady stream of
European directives through the 1990s and 2000s seeking to harmonize animal health,
welfare and food safety standards across the EU. Reforms to the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) imposed further reporting requirements on farmers. In total, British livestock
farmers are subject to 26 diﬀerent kinds of on-farm inspection from eight diﬀerent
government agencies (Defra, 2013b), as well as other checks by private sector assurance
schemes.
Responsibility for enforcing statutory animal welfare regulations in England is divided
between several dedicated inspectorates and levels of the state. Generalist auditors from the
Rural Payments Agency check compliance with various record-keeping requirements under
so-called ‘cross-compliance’ inspections mandated by the CAP, while specialist veterinary
inspectors from the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA)1 assess compliance with
health and welfare standards and other requirements set out by the EU Animal Welfare
Directive (98/58/EC). APHA also conduct animal welfare inspections on behalf of some
local authorities. Many local authorities also employ their own inspectors to discharge their
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statutory responsibilities for enforcing animal welfare regulations in England. Inspectors
have a range of powers for responding to any regulatory breeches uncovered by their
audit and inspection activities. As well as advice and guidance, they can also deploy an
escalating ‘enforcement pyramid’ of more punitive sanctions against non-compliant farmers,
who may see their CAP subsidies reduced2 or face civil penalties and prosecution for more
serious violations.
Such audit-based approaches to regulatory enforcement have become increasingly
common – and controversial – in Britain. Geographers and anthropologists have often
approached audit under the sign of neoliberalism (Enticott, 2014; Larner, 2003; Shore and
Wright, 2015; Strathern, 2000; White, 2016). Thus in agro-food studies, the proliferation of
private standards audited by third party certiﬁers is often cited as a hallmark of the
neoliberalization of the global food system (Guthman, 2007; Haggerty et al., 2009; Lockie
and Higgins, 2007). However, Kipnis (2008) highlights the ambiguity of this association,
whose force and meaning vary depending on the place and disciplinary circuits in which
ideas of audit and neoliberalism are invoked. From political science, Moran (2003) and
Hood et al. (1999) associate audit with the demise of an old style of secretive and
unaccountable ‘club government’ in Britain and the emergence, in its place, of a
‘regulatory state’, based on principles of new public management. From a
governmentality perspective, audit and assurance schemes are often theorized in terms of
a shift in the instruments of governance, as command-and-control regulations give way to
less direct and typically non-statutory approaches to achieving regulatory goals through
attitude and behaviour change interventions like education and information disclosure
(Jones et al., 2014; Rose et al., 2006).
Critics have highlighted several perverse and unintended consequences of governing
through audit (Power, 1997). First, auditing records to assess regulatory compliance tends
not only to displace the original purpose for keeping them but also to colonize
organizational identity and distort performance (Rothstein et al., 2006). In England, the
introduction of performance measurement systems has encouraged schools and hospitals to
hit their auditable targets at the expense of less measureable qualities of education and health
care (Bevan and Hood, 2006; Mannion and Braithwaite, 2012; Wilson et al., 2006), while
also generating vast quantities of paperwork to feed audit systems that divert resources and
managerial attention from other organizational priorities (Ashworth et al., 2002; Brewer
and Walker, 2010; Singleton, 2012).
Second, basing regulatory enforcement on audits of organizational paperwork and
record-keeping tends to decouple compliance judgments from the outcomes those
processes are meant to assure. Bromley and Powell (2012) distinguish two types of
decoupling to which audit and quality assurance processes are prone. First, their
requirements are often ignored in practice. For example, farmers may fail to record, as
they are required, exactly when on-farm mortalities are discovered and then struggle to
assemble their paperwork afterwards and keep their practices aligned with the reporting
requirements. This ﬁrst type of ‘policy-practice decoupling’ may arise unwittingly or more
strategically based on how much corner-cutting regulatees think they can get away with.
Bromley and Powell’s second type of ‘means-ends decoupling’ occurs when formal rules are
observed to the letter but fail to achieve their stated aims. In this case, audit becomes purely
performative: farmers fulﬁl regulatory requirements by form-ﬁlling rather than actually
delivering animal care. Similar complaints have been made about the rituals of academic
quality assurance, which emphasize adherence to procedure over substantive educational
outcomes (Strathern, 2000).
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In contrast to this focus on organizational responses to audit, a complimentary strand
of STS-inspired research has sought to understand the ways in which objects, like audit
trails and paperwork, materialize the political and become consequential as ‘things that
force thought . . . and are active parties in political disputes’ (Braun and Whatmore, 2010:
xxiv). Drawing on this more-than-human understanding of politics and its modalities
(Donaldson et al., 2013; Latour, 2007), Barry (2013) describes how ‘the operation of
transparency conﬁgures as ‘‘public’’ certain objects and problems in the expectation that
this will enable the form and intensity of public debate to be contained’ (p. 11) but
paradoxically ends up ‘generat[ing] new concerns, sites and problems about which it
matters to disagree’ (p. 5). Accordingly, Barry emphasizes the analytical importance of
attending to ‘the boundaries between what is rendered public and what is not’ and the
role of materials in eﬀecting it (p. 12). The tensions between what is on and oﬀ the
record are as old as writing itself, as Vismann (2008) shows in her history of ﬁling
technologies. From the clay tablets and scrolls of the ancient world to the computer
ﬁles of the digital age, Vismann (2008: xii) shows how ﬁles literally ‘process the
separation of law into authority and administration’, creating the distinction between
‘abstract law on one side and the agencies that set down and enforce the law on the
other’ on which the impartial rule of law depends. However, these distinctions do not
always hold in practice. In his ethnography of urban governance in Pakistan, Hull (2012)
shows how paper, in the form of maps, permits and petitions, is a source of power, but
one that bureaucrats are not always able to control because of resistance both from
subaltern groups and from the very medium itself whose materiality – the diﬃculties
of storage, retrieval and authentication and of reliable replication and transmission –
deﬁed their designs.
This agonistic approach to the political and the agency of unruly materials in it builds on
an older tradition of STS research on the social shaping of technology. From this perspective
technologies do not have ﬁxed capacities; rather their material form, meaning and eﬀectivity
as heterogeneous assemblages are shaped through what Latour (1987) calls the ‘trials of
strength’ between users and the behavioural ‘scripts’ built into them (Akrich, 1992). Unlike
the symbolic interactionist approach to the ‘cultural scripts’ performed by farmers in
responding to bovine TB (Vanclay and Enticott, 2011), this STS approach recognizes the
power of objects themselves to object to the scripts projected upon them. It provides an
alternative to neo-functionalist accounts of policy ‘spill-over’ (Strøby Jensen, 2013; Zito,
1999) for explaining the capacity of audits and other regulatory instruments, like ﬂood maps
(Porter and Demeritt, 2012) or the British Cattle Tracing System (Singleton, 2012), to
generate controversy and produce unintended consequences. This generative quality of
materiality suggests that the challenges to better regulation may not lie solely in the
organizational pathologies of audit, but also in the practical diﬃculties of successfully
adapting the paperwork itself to diﬀerent purposes.
Methodology
To explore these questions, the paper draws on 31 in-depth interviews with pig and dairy
farmers (n¼ 25) and front-line animal welfare inspectors (n¼ 6: 4 government inspectors and
2 private certiﬁers) in England, as well as desk-based policy document analysis and ﬁeld
visits to 7 dairy and 9 pig farms to observe farm records and record-keeping ﬁrst-hand.
Research focused on dairy and pig farms because these sectors have the highest rates of
compliance with record-keeping requirements. As such their study might identify lessons for
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the less compliant sheep and beef cattle sectors. On the other hand, if problems with
paperwork are experienced in even the most compliant livestock sectors, they are likely to
be more widespread and severe elsewhere.
Participating farmers were recruited through industry trade bodies – British Pig
Executive and DairyCo – whose regional ﬁeld operators approached farmers with an
invitation letter describing the research and asking for volunteers willing to be
interviewed and/or entertain on-farm site visits. The pig farms visited ranged from a
lone farmer enterprise with less than 25 breeding sows to large commercial operations
with >1000 breeding sows, or more than twice the national average of 447. Dairy farms in
the sample varied much less in size, ranging from just below the national average of 125
milking cows to several with over 300 cows. However, even the largest farm had less than
10 employees, making them typical of the 98% of farm in England classed as ‘micro-
businesses’ (Macdonald et al., 2011, paragraph 1.07).
Interviews focused on record-keeping practices, how records are used by farmers and
inspectors, and on informants’ understandings of animal welfare, good animal husbandry
and the regulatory process. Analysis involved inductive coding to identify emerging themes,
which were compared across informant type and then cross-checked against the oﬃcial
guidance for government inspections, the views expressed by inspectors, and ﬁrst-hand
observations of records and record-keeping from the on-site farm visits. In the analysis
that follows, informants are identiﬁed by an individual alphanumeric code (F¼Farmer;
I¼ Inspector).
Animal record-keeping: Welfare requirements and uses
Farmers in England are legally required to keep a variety of records on their stock and to
make these available for auditing by government inspectors. Our analysis focuses on the
three major types of records used for animal welfare regulation: mortality records, medicine
records and FHP.
Mortality records
The legal requirement of the current Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) Regulations 2007
(WOFAR) for farmers to maintain a record ‘of the number of mortalities found on each
inspection of animals’ has its origin in a series of European Directives passed in the early 1990s
to harmonize the common market. In the shadow of the BSE crisis, the Animal Registration
Directive (92/102/EEC) required farmers to record the birth, movement and mortality of all
farmed cows, pigs, sheep and goats. In a classic form of Monnet-style of ‘Europeanization by
stealth’ (Weale, 1999), these registration records were then tapped for other purposes,
including CAP subsidy administration (Council Regulation EEC 3508/92), biosecurity
monitoring (Council Directive 97/12/EC), and food labelling (Regulation 1760/2000/EC).
This same process saw the scope and purpose of mortality records expanded further to
speak for animal welfare. As well as setting out broad standards for farm animal care, the
Animal Welfare Directive (98/58/EC) mobilized record-keeping as an assurance mechanism.
Annex 1 required farmers to record mortalities for all farmed animals, rather than just those
covered by 92/102/EEC, to keep those records for three years, and to make them ‘available to
the competent authority when carrying out an inspection’.
Animal welfare inspectors see these records as key to ensuring the health and welfare of
farm animals. Beyond simply verifying the existence of the required mortality records,
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inspectors also reported routinely looking at them to inform their judgments of whether
farmers were delivering appropriate care. I6 explained how s/he used them to start
conversations with the farmer about care:
you will check that period of mortalities [and if the farmer explains] these calves were very poorly
[then you say] well then, show me on your records that you treated them . . . and you did try to
improve their health?
Mortality records provide front-line inspectors an indicator of welfare problems and
standards.
Inspectors wanted farmers to use their mortality records in this same way: to monitor and
assess welfare standards. All of the inspectors interviewed emphasized the importance of
record-keeping for controlling death on the farm. Without records farmers
cannot make linkages between why suddenly at the end of the rearing period they’ve had a 6%
mortality when the previous six months they’ve had 3% (I1).
Nor can they know, ‘if they are getting more calf deaths in the winter? . . . or was it in the
spring?’ (I2), which would suggest a diﬀerent cause.
Inspectors had a normative vision of the ‘good’ farmer as an analytical farmer, using
records to monitor on-farm performance, set targets for improvement, and assess progress at
meeting them. While the formal requirements for animal welfare record-keeping appear
quite light-touch, meeting inspectors’ informal expectations was more demanding. Beyond
simply recording mortality, inspectors also wanted farmers to analyse and act on their
records as well. This expectation that ‘Recording of mortalities is a useful management
tool’ is written into the guidance document given to APHA (2014) inspectors about what
to look for when assessing compliance with WOFAR duties.
But these ideals of animal welfare practice were not always reﬂected in the wording of
WOFAR regulations. To minimize regulatory burdens the Welfare Directive allows farmers
to satisfy its record-keeping requirements with ‘equivalent information . . . kept for other
purposes’. Thus when asked about their mortality records, many farmers referred to the
records they kept on carcass disposal under the Animal By-Products (Enforcement)
(England) Regulations 2011 and Regulation (EC) 142/2011. Dairy farmers often pointed to
their animal movement records. Cattle are individually tagged and farmers must report the
date of each individual death to the British Cattle Movement Service within 7 days (Singleton,
2012). Using movement records for mortality was more diﬃcult for pig farmers, because pigs
are not registered individually but with a County Parish Holding Number for tracing pork
back to its source, but farmers had many other ways of reworking existing records to satisfy
the Directive’s mortality record-keeping requirements. Without deﬁnitive guidance, their
practices varied widely within and between livestock sectors. Some looked to records kept
about the productivity (i.e. milk volumes or piglet production) and dates of insemination and
farrowing/calving of individual animals, while others used herd-level inventories and sought
to derive the number who died on-farm by comparing herd-sizes over diﬀerent rearing periods
and subtracting the number taken to slaughter.
Such alternative records were not always acceptable to inspectors, despite the allowances
made for them in the Welfare Directive. APHA (2014) guidance for inspectors explained:
Key livestock sectors likely to be recording less frequently are sheep and pigs, who may record
ﬁnal numbers alive at the end of a rearing period and calculate the diﬀerence from live births
recorded. This is not acceptable for meeting WOFAR or XC [EU cross-compliance]
requirements.
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However, front-line inspectors found that interpreting those requirements was ‘a bit of a
grey area’ (I6) and used discretion in assessing compliance. They found ‘a lot of the failings
were on mortality records’, (I1) because ‘farmers don’t really know the diﬀerence between
mortality records and their animal by-product records’ (I6). For the former farmers must
note the date they discovered any on-farm mortality and retain these records for three years,
whereas the latter require them to record how they disposed of the carcass and retain those
records for just two years. Compliance with the latter was generally better than the former:
in my experience . . . I don’t ﬁnd the average situation I go to, that they have very accurate, if
indeed any, mortality records. They will faithfully keep their receipts if things have had to go to the
knackerman as in their animal by-products regulations . . . but you won’t have any sort of sensible
records of mortality . . . I think it’s something that’s really lacking with most farmers (I5).
Generating the records required by law was not suﬃcient for the sort of anticipatory analysis
endorsed by Defra’s (2003b) own Code of Recommendations for the Welfare of Livestock.
Additional eﬀort was needed:
We do keep, we do know what has died on farm, and calves and cows and whatever is gone, but
it’s hard to get the information in the movement book. It’s all there, but it takes time to ﬁnd out
every cow that died from this November to last November; it would take me a good hour, sitting
down to go through it all (F4).
But beyond the work this required, there are at least two other reasons why farmers are not
acting on their mortality records as regulators imagine that they should.
First, mortalities are not unusual on a farm. As long as the numbers seem low, farmers do
not bother investigating the reasons for any particular death (Palmer et al., 2009). A number of
informants reported not getting ‘too uptight about reasons for it when it’s at that level’ (F24).
Mortality only becomes a matter of concern when it exceeds expectations. As F14 explained:
because we do have a very low level of mortality, it’s not very important to us, so it’s not
something I continually chase.
While inspectors might retort that there is no way of knowing if mortality is low without
analysing their records, farmers are comfortable making that judgment intuitively. For
farmers, the purpose of mortality records is proving to other people what they already
know themselves through daily interactions with their livestock.
Second, death is not only normal on a farm; it is also very diﬃcult to account for. On pig
farms, even counting losses is diﬃcult:
Piglet losses is a diﬃcult one. They’re outdoors, they get lost in the straw, yes, and we don’t
know who died (F15).
Farmers are conscious that disturbing post-partum sows to count their piglets and thereby
get better data might actually increase mortality. Counting dead calves is less problematic as
they are bigger, born in smaller litters, and not liable to being eaten by their mothers like
dead piglets. But identifying the causes of death in cows is no less diﬃcult, as F10 explained:
Mortality is a diﬃcult one in cows because it does go in trends but you can’t often ﬁnd out why.
Pig farmers also ﬁnd explanation elusive:
We know in most of our herds that it’s either going to be a small pig, a death
unexplained . . . unexplained are over half . . . a lot of deaths are unexplained (F24).
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More fundamentally, farmers do not see the value in mortality analysis. Explaining the
causes of death ex post seemed beside the point:
We can give ourselves a culling rate . . . but if an animal dies it’s no good analysing it. It’s
dead . . .What can you do about it? (F5).
This farmer was not uncaring. S/he saw no point in looking back because mortality is so
capricious and diﬃcult to prevent. This sense of impotence in the face of death was often
echoed by other farmers:
It could be unfortunate, we just had a couple of animals die because we sort of got a little bit of
pneumonia in there or, you know, or just a couple of cows died during calving, and there’s
nothing much you can do about that (F6).
Farmers felt like death was a matter of misfortune (cf. Andrews et al., 2006). It might
be counted and recorded after the fact, but there is nothing much that could be done
to prevent it. Accordingly, farmers see the work required to record mortality as
burdensome paperwork and not an integral part of good stockmanship. This
decoupling of animal welfare paperwork from practice is even more noticeable in the
case of medicine records.
Medicine records
In addition to mortality, WOFAR also requires farmers to record ‘any medicinal treatment
given to animals’. This demand is directly transposed from the Animal Welfare Directive
(98/58/EC). As with mortality, the Directive promised to minimize administrative burdens
by repurposing a host of already existing EU record-keeping requirements for assuring
compliance with other regulations controlling the use of special or prohibited substances
in animal husbandry (Regulation 85/649/EEC), classifying organic farms (Regulation
EEC/2092/91), and preventing product residues entering the food chain (Council Directive
96/23/EC).
Animal welfare inspectors look closely at these records. APHA (2014) guidance speciﬁes
that they ‘should ask to see any medicines and product invoices present on the farm and
be satisﬁed that their use is being recorded’. Verifying the existence and accuracy of these
records is required for assessing compliance not just with welfare standards, but also with
food safety and biosecurity regulations. In STS terms, it is the immutability of the
medicines records that allows them to be mobilized to speak, authoritatively, to such a
multiplicity of regulatory purposes. As these purposes proliferated, the assurance that the
medicine records originally provided ‘to the assessor that . . .withdrawal periods are met
before an animal goes to slaughter or their milk is used’ (I4) was inverted. Rather than
looking for the absence of medicine use, animal welfare inspectors looked to those same
records for assurance that medicines were being administered to care for animals. As I6
explained:
The only way for us to know if the farmer is doing a good job is seeing that he is doing a lot of
treatments . . . If he doesn’t keep the records, we don’t know.
Inspectors frequently highlighted the value of medicine records as an indicator of animal
welfare. A quick scan of the records could reveal whether there had been any animal
health problems and whether farmers were providing appropriate treatment. ‘The
medicine records for me are an indication that the animals are receiving a level of care,
whether that’s preventative or reactive’, explained I5. Inspectors related how much they
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could glean about the quality of on-farm animal care from the wear and tear on the
medicine book itself:
It’s very interesting to see that sometimes the medicine book is written all in the same colour pen.
I did one visit and it was all written in a silver pen. Diﬀerent dates. And I said do you always use
a silver pen to write your medicine record with? But it was very clear that he had just written it in
quickly the day before. He might have had it in other little pieces of paper (I6).
While inspectors themselves use the records for auditing regulatory compliance, this is not
what they understand their true purpose to be. Rather than providing an audit trail for
external inspection, medicine records are framed by regulators as an essential tool for
farmers themselves to use in improving animal welfare and productivity. Farmers ‘cannot
work on reducing medicine bills if [they] don’t know what [they’re] actually giving the
medicines for’ (I1). Oﬃcial guidance from Defra’s Veterinary Medicines Directorate
(VMD, 2012, page 5) also emphasizes to farmers ‘that it may be in your commercial
interest’ to keep and use medicines records.
At the herd level, epidemiological analysis of the medicine records can help farmers
prevent recurring problems by identifying whether they are ‘typically seeing spikes in
some respiratory disease in autumn and spring’ (I2), for example. At the individual
animal level, inspectors expect that medicine records would also help determine when to
end the suﬀering of an animal unlikely ever to recover.
Farmers, however, understand the practice of animal husbandry and the place of record-
keeping within it in some diﬀerent ways. Rather than analysing records before deciding what
to do, F7 insisted that s/he would know right away:
I’m quicker than that, so if I’ve got a report [from the milking parlour] and every other cow with
digital dermatitis, I would be going down today to try and investigate why . . . I don’t wait until
next month to analyse it.
In other words, farmers discover problems through their daily practices of care, not by
analysing their records. This emphasis on daily observation and interaction over records
and analysis was common among all farmers, regardless of herd size. Similarly, they cited
good stockmanship, rather than records, as key to knowing whether an animal is recovering.
This, in turn, is understood as involving a direct relationship with the animal (Singleton,
2012). Farmers look to their animals, rather than their records about them, when deciding
whether to cull the sick:
Either I give her an antibiotic and she gets over it or she’s out. And then I’ve got to make a
decision. It’s quite straightforward. Is she ﬁt to walk up the back of the lorry on four legs and if
she’s not, bang, that’s it (F3).
So, at the individual level as well, stockmanship prevails over the kind of records-based,
scientiﬁc analysis idealized by veterinary experts and welfare inspectors.
Even if farmers were inclined to use their records in that way, their physical form inhibits
epidemiological analysis. Many farmers keep daybooks and farm diaries in which they
record medicine usage, but their chronological structure makes it diﬃcult to pick out
information either about individual animals or the herd as a whole. Nor are the templates
oﬀered by farm assurance schemes for recording medicine usage much better. These records
are designed to protect the human food chain by accounting for the purchase, administration
and ultimate disposal of veterinary medicines. Their units of account are the batch and the
dose, rather than the animal or the illness. As such they are unsuited to assessing animal
welfare or epidemiology at either the individual or herd level. As F17 put it, ‘that’s the thing
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we don’t have on the records; we don’t have her past treatment record’. Templates are useful
for compliance, but not much else:
If you want to use them as a management tool they are no good; they’re no good (F10).
This mismatch between the demands of regulatory reporting and animal care was also
acknowledged by some inspectors:
The reason the medicine books were set up as they are is just really following what the veterinary
medicine regulations say: you need to keep the name or identiﬁcation of the animal, what you
gave it, when you gave it, withdrawal period. Because that is the law. It’s not really done in a way
that facilitates interpretation or monitoring of an animal. If farmers recorded everything more
appropriately, such as weight of the animal or reason for treatment, they would see the value of
the record instead of just recording what they need to record by law and getting annoyed with
the fact that they’ve got to record something on a bit of paper (I1).
This inspector worried that record-keeping is decoupled from the wider goal of welfare.
Keeping medicine records has become an end in itself, used for no other purpose than
demonstrating compliance with record-keeping requirements. Farmers were quite upfront
about this:
The actual writing of the medication down, the batch numbers, the lot numbers, the withdrawal
periods, for me personally is meaningless . . . I just want to be legal for the farm assurance (F24).
Paperwork is meaningless for this farmer because it does nothing to inform farm practice. It
is just about being legal. Caring for lame animals is something else entirely, as the reactions
to the FHPs show quite clearly.
Farm health and welfare plans
Whereas mortality and medicines record-keeping is legally required by EU Directive, FHPs
are a voluntary instrument developed by Defra. Despite these diﬀerences in origin and legal
status, FHPs show a similar plasticity in their purpose. They were ﬁrst promoted as
biosecurity tools in the wake of the 2001 foot and mouth outbreak. In this context FHPs
were all about ‘keeping disease out of farms’, though Defra (2001: 2) also noted that ‘in the
future [they] will become an important part of the ‘‘Farm to Fork’’ approach to ensuring
food safety’. There was no reference to animal welfare.
Over the next few years, FHPs were recast as self-regulatory instruments for improving
animal welfare. Defra’s (2003b: 6) Codes of Recommendations for the Welfare of Livestock
urges farmers to:
draw up a written health and welfare plan with the herd’s vet . . .You should review and update
your health and welfare plan at least once a year . . .. The plan should include enough records to
enable you to monitor and assess the health and welfare of the herd.
The Defra (2003b: 10, 23) code refers to FHPs nine times in all, providing extensive detail
about what issues they ‘should, as a minimum, look at’ as well as instructions for how
farmers should use them as part of a ‘thorough assessment and planned approach’ to
animal welfare. By emphasizing ex ante planning, target-setting and progress monitoring,
FHPs reinforce the ‘behavioural script’ (Akrich, 1992) for good farming described in the
last two sections (cf. Phillipson et al., 2004). To deliver the ‘longer term culture change
whereby FHP become a routine feature of livestock management’, Defra spent nearly
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»3 million promoting FHPs as a more ‘proactive’ approach for improving animal welfare
and for ‘making animal keepers work closely with vets . . . to set targets for health and
welfare and to measure, manage, and monitor productivity’ (Osmond, 2009, paragraph
1.4, 1.6).
Given the very prominent role they accorded to the veterinary profession, it is not
surprising that professionally certiﬁed veterinary inspectors think highly of FHPs.
Echoing the anticipatory vision of good husbandry advocated by Defra, I1 explained how
the FHP would help farmers take a more analytical approach to animal welfare:
That plan is not just about ‘I’m going to get these pigs vaccinated at this age’. It’s about ‘I’m
going to monitor the health and welfare of these animals’ and ‘I’m going to keep records’.
This view of record-keeping and monitoring as beneﬁcial for the farmer was universal among
the inspectors we interviewed:
most of the records we require are because we think that there is actually a beneﬁt to the farmer
for having them, so something like their health plan, we think that’s actually a beneﬁt for the
business to have it documented, clearly explaining all the processes (I5).
But inspectors also conceded that farmers do not often see it that way, and so they work
hard during inspections to ‘make them understand that it is useful for them’ (I4).
Although FHPs are not something they are required to check as part of any cross-
compliance or animal welfare inspections, inspectors like to see them anyway. Their
presence is taken as a sign that the farmer is meeting the required standards:
if you’ve got very good up to date well completed records, as the rule of thumb, the farm is quite
good and you wouldn’t expect there to be major welfare problems (I2).
The FHP provides tangible proof that the farmer has complied with Defra’s (2003b: 2)
recommendation that s/he ‘should demonstrate caring and responsible planning and
management’. However, those caring and planning processes that the physical FHP
stands for necessarily escape direct inspection. All the inspector can ever do is audit the
paperwork: ‘they’ve got to have a proactive approach to health planning. That is normally
demonstrated by them having a documented health plan’ (I4). Inspectors are conscious of
this slippage and look closely for gaps between farm paperwork and practice. I3 described
inspection practice this way:
‘the assessors, they are looking for a copy of the document on ﬁle, but I suppose in absence of the
document they would be asking . . . about what do they do on farm to limit diﬀerent issues, and
they might ask that before they even look at the document, but they might look at the document
afterwards and check that it links up with what the farmer’s saying.
While it is possible to have an animal welfare plan without putting it to paper, assurance and
audit require paperwork to prove that planning has been done and ‘demonstrate that the
farmer is proactively thinking about what they can do to manage potential problems on their
farm’ (I4).
The material FHP document serves other purposes that the planning processes it records
cannot. If an inspector discovers welfare problems, the existence of the FHP is an important
mitigating factor shaping inspector judgments about whether the farmer has violated
WOFAR. As inspector I1 explained:
Even if they’ve got a massive problem, if they’ve got 30% lameness, there’s evidence that they are
doing something about it.
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Seeing the FHP, inspectors are more likely to judge farmers as compliant with the
WOFAR duty to take ‘all reasonable steps to ensure’ animal welfare. In the event of
a criminal prosecution, the existence of the FHP is important for the farmer’s legal
defence. Under the Animal Welfare Act 2006 s14(4b), compliance with a relevant
provision of Defra’s (2003b) Code of Recommendations, such as having a FHP, ‘may
be relied upon as tending to negative liability’. Such a ‘due diligence’ defence requires
FHP paperwork to record what the farmer has done to satisfy the reasonableness duty of
the statute.
Farmers readily acknowledged the value of the FHP as a physical record. As F11
explained, ‘it’s just sitting down and formalising what we’re doing, really . . .’ Similarly
F9 said, ‘all it’s doing is recording what we do anyway’. For many farmers this
accounting process is entirely externalized, as something ‘done by the vet’ (F13), so
much so, in fact, that farmers sometimes struggled to say what – and where – their
FHP actually was when interviewed about them. F18 needed to be reminded by the
farm manager that ‘it’s what [name of vet] sends us after s/he has been for a visit’,
prompting F18 to exclaim, ‘Ah! A vet report!’ F17 was equally befuddled when asked
about the FHP:
Yes, well, the veterinary health plan, I think . . . let me see . . . [rummaging through the ﬁles] I
don’t have a health plan here at the moment; I think it’s at home . . . it might be at home . . . that’ll
be at home.
This indiﬀerence is not surprising, since the FHP is not something farmers are active in
formulating. It is simply a collection of management protocols farmers are required to
document. Farmers describe its function in terms of ‘backing up’, ‘conﬁrming’ and
providing a ‘historical picture’.
As such the FHP is something to be ﬁled away, rather than actively used in day-to-day
decision-making as Defra (2003b) and veterinary inspectors expect it should be. Asked if s/he
ever used the FHP, F17 replied:
No. It’s just another thing that we have to keep – another item of paperwork, like all the other
paperwork that we have to keep for so many years.
This was a universal view among all 25 farmers interviewed. The FHP is produced to
demonstrate compliance:
To show my farm assurance man when he comes around every year, show I’ve got one (F15).
Complying with those external demands simply requires producing a piece of paper rather
than actually using it for anything else.
This decoupling of means from ends also contributes to ‘policy-practice’ decoupling
(Bromley and Powell, 2012), as the FHP tends both to lag behind and to drift away
from the care practices it is supposed to inform and assure. Farmers complete their
paperwork in ﬁts and starts around the edges of their daily farm work. Daily farm
work takes priority, and keeping records up-to-date is a constant challenge. When
farmers sit down to do their paperwork there is then the challenge of reconstructing a
coherent account of what has been done from the various notebooks, receipts and other
ﬁles in which activities around the farm are recorded. It is those records that form the
reference point for updating annually the FHP rather than the actual practices it is
supposed to be informing ex ante. In turn, since inspectors look at the FHP paperwork
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rather than any planning that might have gone into it, if discrepancies arise between what
was recorded and what is recalled, it is the paperwork that prevails when inspectors judge
compliance. As I4 explained:
When you’re talking to [farmers], they will all say they are doing something, but if they have
written it down on a piece of paper, that’s another matter. They always say, ‘it’s all in my head. I
don’t need to do it.’ And I say, ‘well, you do need to show me on record’.
This tendency for audits to become decoupled from the practices they are supposed to
control is now well documented (Power, 1997), though it has typically been explained in
terms of institutional incentives to game compliance processes and avoid blame for failures
(Bevan and Hood, 2006), rather than the materiality of the paperwork involved in
assembling the records themselves.
This decoupling of farm paperwork and practice is also driven by farmers’ understandings
of good animal husbandry (Burton, 2004). Such ideals clearly vary – historical, national,
sectorial and farm-size variations are all well documented in the literature (Demeritt, 1995;
Haggerty et al., 2009; McGuire et al., 2012; Silvasti, 2003). Nevertheless the 25 farmers we
interviewed were unanimous in seeing no practical use for FHPs. Rather than looking to
their FHPs or other records to help them anticipate and manage animal welfare problems,
farmers deﬁne stockmanship as the ability to do that intuitively. As F25 explained:
You don’t go back and look at patterns because you see patterns as you go through really.
Good animal husbandry is all about anticipating problems and knowing how to deal with
them. F13 was eﬀusive on this point:
The stockman, if he’s worth his money, knows if things are right, or if things are not right . . . by
what he sees, what he smells, what he hears . . .Forget about tick-box recording. How are you
going to record 100 pigs in the pen, and how many scratches they’ve got?
Records are no match for the intuition of the skilful farmer, who can smell trouble before it
ever shows up in the records. By contrast recording-keeping is retrospective in its
orientation, and so can only ever detect problems after the farmer has already dealt with
them, when it isn’t focused on recording the wrong things altogether.
Records, regulation and animal welfare
Our analysis highlights consistent diﬀerences between farmers and regulators in their
engagements with the three major types of records used for statutory animal welfare
regulation. Regulatory inspectors and veterinary experts frame record-keeping as an
instrument for internal farm management rather than external regulation and assurance.
They believe keeping records is beneﬁcial for farmers and key to improving animal welfare.
Accordingly, regulators tend to perceive regulatory record-keeping requirements as light
touch because they assume farmers are already collecting them for their own use. In this
self-eﬀacing conceit, regulators frame audit as a process of simply peering over the farmer’s
shoulder to look at the farmer’s own already existing records. Far from burdening farmers,
regulatory record-keeping would be beneﬁcial, if farmers would only use their records
properly.
By contrast, farmers see record-keeping very diﬀerently. Notwithstanding diﬀerences in
sector, farming style and scale, the farmers we interviewed consistently described welfare
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records in terms of satisfying external accountability demands. While farmers do some
record-keeping of their own, particularly related to farm productivity and work routines,
welfare records are something they do for others rather than for their own purposes.
Consequently, farmers perceive record-keeping requirements as burdensome, even if their
importance for consumer conﬁdence and biosecurity is generally accepted.
These competing perceptions both reﬂect and reinforce the diﬀerent ways that regulatory
inspectors and farmers engage with the physical records themselves. Despite their belief that
animal welfare records are primarily management tools for the farmer, inspectors rely on
them to make their own compliance judgments (Roe et al., 2011). Without veterinary
expertise, auditors from the RPA and private certiﬁers tend to deﬁne compliance simply
in terms of the presence of the records and their internal consistency with other records
(RPA, 2014). But even the more expert inspectors from APHA use records in judging
whether farmers are meeting the required welfare standards. As well as assessing
compliance with formal record-keeping requirements, APHA inspectors also scrutinize the
quality of farmers’ paperwork in the belief that it is central to farm management and
therefore provides a crucial indicator of welfare standards and of farmers’ eﬀorts to meet
them. The generative quality of materials allows the records to speak for the farmers’
diligence and professionalism as well as the quality of animal care they are providing. In
both respects, therefore, records are central to inspectors’ practices for assessing regulatory
compliance.
Farmers, in turn, understand this and try to organize their record-keeping to comply with
those external demands. However, farmers see welfare records as secondary to animal
husbandry, in the sense both of being less important than minding their actual stock and
also of coming afterwards to document for others what the farmer already knows to have
been done. Partly as a result, there is a tendency for on-farm animal care to become
decoupled from the paperwork generated to demonstrate regulatory compliance.
While this decoupling is now a familiar staple of academic critique (Power, 1997;
Strathern, 2000), scholars have not always been careful enough to distinguish the diﬀerent
forms it takes, which involve diﬀerent drivers with diﬀerent consequences for animal welfare
and the goals of better regulation. Bromley and Powell (2012) distinguish two kinds of
decoupling. The ﬁrst, ‘policy-practice decoupling’, whereby formal policies are ignored in
actual practice, is often attributed to strategic behaviour, such as calculated non-compliance
(Braithwaite, 1982) and audit target manipulation (Bevan and Hood, 2006), or to
institutional dynamics that normalize deviance and buﬀer organizational routines from
external scrutiny (Vaughan, 1996). While farmers did not always comply with formal
record-keeping requirements, sometimes confusing by-products and movement records
with mortality records for example, we found no evidence for the sort of systematic
gaming of audit controls that have plagued banking regulation (Miles, 2013), where huge
incentives for noncompliance are countered by eye-watering ﬁnes for ﬁrms caught cheating.
By contrast, in animal welfare the penalties for record-keeping violations are low – just a 3%
reduction in CAP subsidy payment – as are the chances of detection, since barely 1% of
farms are subject to random cross-compliance inspections. Governments are understandably
reluctant to punish farmers for minor paperwork violations, so if violations are common,
this is at least partly because sanctions to deter non-compliance are weak.
For its part, Defra (2014) has pledged to reduce and simplify record-keeping requirements
to make compliance easier, but eﬀorts to increase compliance by repurposing existing
records have made decoupling worse. In keeping with better regulation principles for
reducing administrative burdens, the Welfare Directive allows farmers to satisfy its
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record-keeping requirements with ‘equivalent information . . . kept for other purposes’. In
practice, however, this policy of ﬂexibility has led to confusion among both farmers and
inspectors alike about what regulatory record-keeping is required to satisfy the law.
Farmers are sometimes confused about the proliferation of record-keeping requirements
to which they are subject, while expert veterinary inspectors complain that even when a
farmer’s record-keeping is formally compliant, it is rarely suﬃcient to drive real
improvements in animal welfare.
Thus, in addition to this ﬁrst kind of ‘policy-practice decoupling’, animal welfare
regulation is also hampered by a second kind of ‘means-ends decoupling’ (Bromley and
Powell, 2012), whereby regulatory requirements do not deliver their intended outcome.
Even perfect paperwork is no guarantee of good animal welfare. The law simply requires
farmers to keep records; they are not obligated to use them, as inspectors and animal welfare
experts assume they would and should.
Our research identiﬁes two reasons for such means-ends decoupling of farmers’ regulatory
record-keeping from their practices of animal care. First, farmers understand keeping
records and caring for animals as two distinct and largely unrelated practices. Farmers
keep records to satisfy external demands for assurance about what they themselves
already know about the welfare of their animals from their own daily experience of caring
for them. That direct relationship with their animals is the basis for good welfare outcomes,
farmers insist. Farmers care for their animals by seeing, smelling and listening to them
directly, not through paperwork and analysing records at second-hand. This is a very
diﬀerent script for good animal husbandry to the one promoted by government regulators
and veterinary experts and hard wired into record-keeping requirements in the hope that
they will encourage farmers to use their records as part of a more analytical approach to
animal welfare based on ‘responsible planning and management’ (Defra, 2003a: 2).
However, these record-keeping requirements are unlikely to spur the desired response
from farmers until they are better aligned with farmer’s own understandings of what it
means to be a good farmer and to care for animals well.
Second, even if farmers were inclined to use their records to drive improvements in animal
welfare, their physical form makes it diﬃcult to do so. The requirement to record daily
medicine usage, for example, results in chronological records that account for bottles,
batches and doses but are unhelpful for cross-sectional analysis to detect herd-level
trends, or trace the treatment history of individual animals. Likewise, the information
required to discharge the WOFAR requirement for farmers to note ‘the number of
mortalities found at each inspection’ is not suﬃcient for the kind of epidemiological
analysis needed to improve animal health and welfare, because the age and location of
deaths is not recorded. Farmers could, of course, record this additional information as
well, but see no reason to do more than is required for compliance. Governments might
require farmers to record this information as well, but that would add cost without
addressing the problem of getting farmers actually to use the information they are already
required to collect. A more promising approach would heed the Macdonald et al. (2011,
paragraph 5.17) review recommendation that government work collaboratively with farmers
to redesign the format of the information required for assurance to make it easier to collect
and use. This kind of participatory, co-production approach has proved useful in a number
of other regulatory contexts (Hardy, 2011; Lemos et al., 2012; Nobert et al., 2010). But
as long as animal welfare regulation relies on auditing physical records as a proxy for the
rather less tangible goal of good animal welfare, it will always be prone to means-ends
decoupling.
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Conclusion
The case of animal welfare illustrates the practical diﬃculties of audit-based approaches to
regulatory assurance. To provide a basis for assessing compliance with its broad standards, the
Welfare Directive also requires farmers to keep various records and make them available for
external inspection. Farmers resent the resulting paperwork as burdensome, and record-
keeping violations are the most common animal welfare breach recorded in random cross-
compliance inspections in England.Moreover, these requirements are substantially decoupled
from both the on-farm practice of delivering animal care and from the wider goals of animal
welfare regulation itself. This tendency for audit processes to become decoupled from the
qualities they are meant to assure has been noted by other critics of audit (Davey and
Richards, 2013; Power, 1997; Strathern, 2000), though without always distinguishing
carefully enough between the decoupling of policy from practice and of means from ends.
Animal welfare regulation suﬀers from both kinds of decoupling, and by adopting an
STS-inspired approach we have shown how the pathologies of audit are exacerbated by the
materiality of paperwork itself, which has resisted better regulation strategies for reducing
red tape. Eﬀorts to ease administrative burdens by auditing already existing records have
resulted in record-keeping requirements and inspection processes that are unsuited either to
judging whether welfare standards are actually being met or to informing farmers’ own
animal care practices. Nevertheless, as part of its ongoing commitment to reducing
administrative burdens on agriculture, Defra (2013a) is committed to making more use
farmers’ own internal record-keeping for an ever expanding list of regulatory purposes.
Our analysis suggests that these reforms are likely to fail not simply because their goals of
less and yet somehow ‘better’ regulation are in strong tension with each other, but also
because of the diﬃculties involved in repurposing paperwork created for one purpose so
as to provide regulatory assurance of something else.
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Notes
1. At the time of our research APHA was known as the Animal Health and Veterinary Agency
(AHVLA), but for clarity we refer to it, somewhat anachronistically, as APHA throughout the
article.
2. Whereas cross-compliance breaches due to negligence incur a 3% reduction in CAP Single Payment
Scheme subsidy per violation, the penalty for intentional violations is 20%, with tariffs adjusted
upwards or downwards depending on the extent, severity and permanence of the violation.
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